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WHY THEY HATE US: THE ROLE

OF SOCIAL DYNAMICS
CASS R. SUNSTEIn*

I.

THE THESIS

My goal in this brief Essay is to cast some new light on a
question that has been much discussed in the aftermath of the
attacks of September 11. The question is simple: Why do they
hate us? I suggest that a large part of the answer lies, not in
anything particular to Islam, to religion, or even to the ravings
of Osama bin Laden, but in social dynamics and especially in
the process of group polarization. When group polarization is
at work, like-minded people, engaged in discussion with one
another, move toward extreme positions. The effect is
especially strong with people who are already quite extreme;
such people can move in literally dangerous directions. It is
unfortunate but true that leaders of terrorist organizations
show a working knowledge of group polarization. They
sharply discipline what is said. They attempt to inculcate a
shared sense of humiliation, which breeds rage, and group
solidarity, which prepares the way for movement toward
further extremes and hence for violent acts. They attempt to
ensure that recruits speak mostly to people who are already
predisposed in the preferred direction. They produce a cult-like
atmosphere.
With an understanding of group polarization, we can see
that when "they hate us," it is often because of social processes
that have been self-consciously created and manipulated by
terrorist leaders. These social processes could easily be
otherwise. If they were, terrorism would not exist, or at least it
* Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, Law
School and Department of Political Science, University of Chicago.
1. See discussion infra Part II; see generally ROGER BROWN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY:

THE SECOND EDITION (1986); Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go
To Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71 (2000).

HeinOnline -- 25 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 429 2001-2002

430

HarvardJournalof Law & Public Policy

[Vol. 25

would be greatly weakened and its prospects would be
diminished. There is no natural predisposition toward
terrorism, even among the most disaffected people in the
poorest nations. When terrorism occurs, it is typically a result
of emphatically social pressures 2 and indeed easily identifiable
mechanisms of interaction. More broadly, ethnic identification
3
and ethnic conflict are a product of similar pressures; an
understanding of "why they hate us" is thus likely to promote
an increased understanding of social hatred in general.
We can draw some conclusions here for the law of
conspiracy, for freedom of association, for the idea of "political
correctness," for the system of checks and balances, and for
possible responses to terrorist threats. Thus I shall identify the
distinctive logic behind the special punishment of conspiracy:
those who conspire are likely to move one another in more
extreme and hence more dangerous directions. I shall also urge
that freedom of association helps to fuel group polarization-a
healthy phenomenon much of the time, but a potentially
dangerous one in some contexts. I shall urge, finally, that an
especially effective way to prevent terrorism is to prevent
"terrorist entrepreneurs" from creating special enclaves of likeminded or potentially like-minded people. It might seem
tempting to object to such efforts on the ground that they
interfere with associational liberty, which is of course prized in
all democratic nations. But we are speaking here of terrorism
and conspiracy to kill American citizens; in such cases, the
claims for associational liberty are very weak. Conspiracy is the
dark side of freedom of association, and it is a form of
conspiracy that I am discussing here. One of my largest goals is
thus to provide a window on the nature and consequences of
conspiracy in the particular context of terrorism.

2. I do not mean to deny the possibility of lone terrorists, or the potential role of
individual hatred, even mental illness, in some terrorist activity.
3. See Timur Kuran, Ethnic Norms and Their Transformation Through Reputational
Cascades,27 J. LEGAL STUD. 623 (1998).
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II. THE BASIC PHENOMENON
A.

What GroupsDo

Let us begin with some social science research that seems
very far afield from the area of terrorism. In 1962, J.A.F. Stoner,
an enterprising graduate student, attempted to examine the
relationship between individual judgments and group
judgments. 4 He did so against a background belief that groups
tended to move toward the middle of their members' predeliberation views. Stoner proceeded by asking people a range
of questions involving risk-taking behavior. People were asked,
for example, whether someone should choose a safe or risky
play in the last seconds of a football game; whether someone
should invest money in a low-return, high-security stock or
instead a high-return, lower security stock; whether someone
should choose a high prestige graduate program in which a
number of people fail to graduate or a lower prestige school
from which everyone graduates.
In Stoner's studies, the subjects first studied the various
problems and recorded an initial judgment; they were then
asked to reach a unanimous decision as a group. People were
finally asked to state their private judgments after the group
judgment had been made; they were informed that it was
acceptable for the private judgment to differ from the group
judgment. What happened? For twelve of the thirteen groups,
the group decisions showed a repeated pattern toward greater
risk-taking. In addition, there was a clear shift toward greater
risk-taking in private opinions as well. Stoner therefore found a
"risky shift," in which the effect of group dynamics was to
move groups, and the individuals that composed them, in
favor of increased risk-taking.
What accounts for this remarkable result? The answer is
emphatically not that groups always move toward greater risktaking. Some groups-asking, for example, about whether and
when someone should get married, or travel despite a possibly
serious medical condition-tend to move toward greater
4. See J.A.F. Stoner, A Comparison of Individual and Group Decisions
Including Risk (1961) (unpublished master's thesis, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, School of Industrial Management) (on file with author); see alsoJ.A.F.
Stoner, Risky and Cautious Shifts in Group Decisions, 4 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.

PSYCHOL. 442 (1968).
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caution. Subsequent studies have shown a consistent pattern,
one that readily explains Stoner's own findings: deliberating
groups tend to move toward a more
• 6 extreme point in line with
their pre-deliberation tendencies. If like-minded people are
talking with one another, they are likely to end up thinking a
more extreme version of what they thought before they started
to talk. It follows that, for example, a group of people who tend
to approve of an ongoing war effort will, as a result of
discussion, become still more enthusiastic about that effort; that
people who think that environmentalists are basically right,
and that the planet is in serious trouble, will become quite
alarmed if they talk mostly with one another; that people who
tend to dislike the Rehnquist Court will dislike it quite
intensely after talking about it with one another; that people
who disapprove of the United States, and are suspicious of its
intentions, will increase their disapproval and suspicion if they
exchange points of view. Indeed, there is specific7 evidence of
the latter phenomenon among citizens of France. It should be
readily apparent that enclaves of people, inclined to terrorist
violence, might move sharply in that direction as a
consequence of internal deliberations.
Three aggravating factors are of special relevance to the issue
of terrorism. First, if members of the group think that they have
a shared identity, and a high degree of solidarity, there will be
heightened polarization. One reason is that if people feel
united by some factor (for example, politics or necessity),
internal dissent will be dampened. Second, if members of the
deliberating jroup are connected by affective ties, polarization
will increase. If they tend to perceive one another as friendly,
likable, and similar to them, the size and likelihood of the shift
will increase.'0 These points obviously bear on the cult-like
5. See BROWN, supra note 1, at 208-10.
6. See id. at 200-48.
7. See id. at 223-24.
8. Dominic Abrams et al., Knowing What To Think By Knowing Who You Are: SelfCategorization and the Nature of Norm Formation, Conformity and Group Polarization,
29 BRrr. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 97,116 (1990).
9. See Brooke Harrington, The Pervasive Effects of Embeddedness in
Organizations 24 (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
10. See Hermann Brandsttter, Social Emotions in Discussion Groups, in DYNAMICS
OF GROUP DECISIONS 93 (Hermann Brandstaitter et al. eds., 1978). In JOHN
TURNER Er AL., REDISCOVERING THE SOCIAL GROUP: A SELF-CATEGORIZATION

THEORY 154-59 (1987), Turner and his co-authors argue for a new synthesis, one
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features of terrorist organizations, in which shared identity
helps fuel movement toward extremes. Third, extremists are
especially prone to polarization. When they start out an
extreme point, they are likely to go much further in the
direction with which they started. Note in this regard that,
burglars in a group act more recklessly than they do as
individuals.
B.

Why Polarization?

What explains these movements? And what explains the
aggravating factors? It is tempting to think that conformity
plays a large role. Conformity may be at work, but the data
make clear that group polarization is not a matter of
conformity; people do not simply shift to the mean of their
respective initial positions.13 In fact there are two principal
explanations for group polarization, involving two different
mechanisms.14 Each of the mechanisms plays a role in
producing group polarization and, as we shall see, each of
them plays a role in terrorist organizations.
The first is based on persuasive arguments. The simple idea
here is that people respond to the arguments made by others,
and the "argument pool," in a group with some initial
disposition in one direction, will inevitably be skewed toward
that disposition. A group whose members tend to think that
that they call "a self-categorization theory of group polarization." Id. at 154. In this
account, "persuasion is dependent upon self-categorizations which create a
common identity within a group," and polarization occurs "because group
members adjust their opinion in line with their image of the group position
(conform) and more extreme, already polarized, prototypicalresponses determine
this inage." Id. at 156. The key point here is that when a group is tending in a
certain direction, the perceived "prototype" is determined by where the group is
leaning, and this is where individuals will shift. See id. at 156. As the authors
acknowledge, their account shows "overlap with many aspects of social
comparison and persuasive arguments models," id. at 158, and because of the
overlap, I do not discuss it as a separate account here. For possible differences in
predictions and supporting evidence, see id. at 158-70.
11. See id. at 157-58.
12. See Paul F. Cromwell et al., Group Effects on Decision-Making by Burglars, 69
PSYCHOL. REP. 579,586 (1991).
13. See BROWN, supra note 1, at 207.
14. For a review of the literature, see BROWN, supra note 1, at 210-17; Daniel J.
Isenberg, Group Polarization:A CriticalReview and Meta-Analysis, 50 J. PERSONALITY
AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 1141 (1986). For an overview and an attempt to generate a
new synthesis, see TURNER E' AL., supra note 10, at 142-70. See also Russell
Hardin, The Crippled Epistemology of Extremism, in POLITICAL EXTREMISM AND
RATIONALrIY (Albert Breton et al. eds., forthcoming 2002).
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the United States is engaged in a general campaign against
Islam, or that it seeks to kill and humiliate Muslims as such,
will hear many arguments to that effect, and few opposing
arguments, simply as a result of the initial distribution of
positions within the group. If people are listening, they will
have a stronger conviction, in the same direction from which
they began, as a result of deliberation. The phenomenon is
general. A group whose members tend to oppose affirmative
action will hear a large number of arguments in favor of
abolishing affirmative action, and a comparatively fewer
number of arguments for retaining it. There is considerable
empirical support for the view that
1 5 the argument pool has this
kind of effect on individual views.
The second mechanism has to do with social influence. The
central idea here is that people have a certain conception of
themselves and a corresponding sense of how they would like
to be perceived by others. Most people like to think of
themselves as not identical to but as different from others, but
only in the right direction and to the right extent. If you think
of yourself as the sort of person who opposes gun control more
than most people do (because, hypothetically, you think that
you are unusually disposed to reject liberal homilies), you
might shift your position once you find yourself in a group that
is very strongly opposed to gun control. If you stay where you
were, you may seem more favorably disposed toward gun
control than most group members, and this may be
disconcerting, thus producing a shift. If you are ill-disposed
toward the West, and believe that President Bush has
imperialistic ambitions, and find yourself in a group with those
same beliefs, you might well move toward a more extreme
point, simply in order to maintain your preferred relationship
to the views of others. Or if you believe that you have a
comparatively favorable attitude toward affirmative action,
discussion with a group whose members are at least as
favorable as you are might well push you in the direction of
greater enthusiasm for it. Having heard group members, you
might move your stated position, simply in order to maintain a
certain self-conception and reputation, as one who likes
affirmative action a bit more than most people do. There is
15. See BROWN, supra note 1, at 200-45.
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evidence that social influence is an independent factor behind
group polarization; consider in particular the fact that mere
exposure to the views of others can have this effect, even
without any discussion at all. 16
There is another point, not stressed in social science research
on group polarization, but much bearing on the general
phenomenon and in particular on the nature and rise of
terrorism. Many people, much of the time, lack full confidence
in their views; such people offer a moderate version of their
views, for fear of being marginalized or ostracized. Many other
people have more confidence than they are willing to show, for
fear of being proved foolish; such people moderate their views
in public. In either case, group dynamics can push people
toward a more extreme position. Moderate skepticism about
the problem of global warming might turn into full-blown
disbelief, if the moderate skeptic finds himself in a group of
people who also tend toward skepticism. I believe that this
phenomenon plays an important role in terrorist enclaves,
which often involve young men who could not possibly
maintain their position if not for the support and
encouragement of like-minded others. I now turn to some
details.
III. TERRORIST LEADERS AS POLARIZATION ENTREPRENEURS

Terrorist leaders act as polarization entrepreneurs. They
create enclaves of like-minded people. They stifle dissenting
views and do not tolerate internal disagreement. They take
steps to ensure a high degree of internal solidarity. They
restrict the relevant argument pool and take full advantage of
reputational forces, above all by using the incentive of group
approval. Terrorist acts themselves are motivated by these
forces and incentives. Consider, for example, the following
account:
Terrorists do not even consider that they may be wrong and
that others' views may have some merit... They attribute
only evil motives to anyone outside their own group. The...
common characteristic of the psychologically motivated
terrorist is the pronounced need to belong to a group....
16. See Allan. I. Teger & Dean G. Pruitt, Components of Group Risk-Taking, 3 J.

EXwPRENTAL Soc. PsYCHOL. 202 (1967).
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Such individuals define their social status by group
acceptance.
Terrorist groups with strong internal motivations find it
necessary to justify the group's existence continuously. A
terrorist group must terrorize. As [sic] a minimum, it must
commit violent acts to maintain group self-esteem and
legitimacy. Thus, terrorists sometimes carry out attacks that
are objectively nonproductive or even counterproductive to
their announced goal.' 7
In fact, terrorist organizations impose psychological
pressures to accelerate the movement in extreme directions.
Here too group membership plays a key role:
Another result of psychological motivation is the intensity of
group dynamics among terrorists. They tend to demand
unanimity and be intolerant of dissent. With the enemy
clearly identified and unequivocally evil, pressure to escalate
the frequency and intensity of operations is ever present.
The need to belong to the group discourages resignations,
and the fear of compromise disallows their acceptance.
Compromise is rejected, and terrorist groups lean toward
maximalist positions. .

.

. In societies in which people

identify themselves in terms of group membership (family,
clan, tribe), there may, be a willingness to self-sacrifice
seldom seen elsewhere.
Training routines specifically reinforce the basic message of
solidarity amidst humiliation. Hitler similarly attempted to
create group membership, and to fuel movements toward
extremes, by stressing the suffering and the humiliation of the
German people. This is a characteristic strategy of terrorists of
all stripes, for humiliation fuels rage. "Many al-Qaida trainees
saw videos.., daily as part of their training routine. Showing
hundreds of hours of Muslims in dire straits -Palestinians...
Bosnians... Chechens... Iraqi children- [was] all part of alQaida's induction strategy." In the particular context of Al
Qaeda, there is a pervasive effort to link Muslims all over the
globe, above all by emphasizing a shared identity, one that
17. Terrorism Research Center, The Basics of Terrorism: Part2: The Terrorists,at
http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/2468/bpart2 (Dec. 16, 2001).
18. Id.
19. On humiliation, see generally AVISHAI MARGALIT, THE DECENT SOCIETY
(Naomi Goldblum trans., 1996).
20. Giles Foden, Secrets of a Terror Merchant, MELBOURNE AGE, Sept. 14, 2001,
available at http://www.theage.com.au/news/world/2001/09/14/FFXIONZFJ
RC.html.
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includes some and excludes others. Thus Osama bin Laden
"appeals to a pervasive sense of humiliation and powerlessness
in Islamic countries. Muslims are victims the world over...
Bosnia, Somalia, Palestine, Chechnya, and... Saudi Arabia ....
who
[HI]e makes the world • simple for people
.
.
s21 are otherwise
confused, and gives them a sense of mission." Hence there are
unmistakable cult-like features to the indoctrination effort:
"[Tihe military training [in Al Qaeda camps] is accompanied
by forceful religious indoctrination, with recruits being fed a
and 22being incessantly
stream of anti-western propaganda jihad."
perform
reminded about their duty to
In addition, the Al Qaeda terrorists are taught to believe that
they are
not alone... but sacrificing themselves as part of a larger
group for what they believe is the greater good. [The men
are] recruited as teenagers, when self-esteem and separation
from family are huge developmental issues. [The
indoctrination] involves not only lessons in weaponry but an
almost cult-like brainwashing over many months. Among
extended periods of
Muslims, the regimen typically inclu9es
2
prayer and a distortion of the Koran.
Intense connections are built into the structure: "The
structure of Al Qaeda, an all-male enterprise... , appears to
involve small groups of relatively young men who maintain
strong bonds with each other, bonds whose intensity is
dramatised and heightened by the secrecy" 4 demanded by their
W
missions and the danger of their projects.
This discussion, brief as it is, should be sufficient to show the
central role of group dynamics in producing terrorists, and
indeed in answering the question "why they hate us."
Terrorists are made, not born. More particularly, terrorists are
made through emphatically social processes. Things could
easily be otherwise. With respect to social concern with risks, it
is possible to imagine multiple equilibria- different social
situations, all of them stable, in which people are concerned
21. Jeffrey Bartholet, Method To the Madness, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 22,2001, at 55.
22. Stephen Grey & Dipesh Gadher, Inside Bin Laden's Academies of Terror,
SUNDAY TIMES (LONDON), Oct. 7,2001, at 10.
23. Margery Eagan, Attack on America: It Could be the TerroristNext Door-Zealot
HidesBehind His Benign Face,BOSTON HERALD, Sept. 13, 2001, at 30.
24. Vithal C Nadkarni, How to Win Over Foes and Influence Their Minds, TIMES OF
INDIA, Oct. 7,2001, availableat 2001 WL 28702843.
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with some risks but not others.25 People in France are not much
concerned about nuclear power, which frightens many
Americans; people in America are not much concerned about
genetically engineered food, which frightens Europeans. Timur
Kuran has shown that "ethnification" -close identification
with one's ethnic group, in a way that involves hatred of
others-is not a matter of history but of current social
processes, closely akin to those discussed here. With relatively
small changes, a nation that suffers from intense ethnic
antagonism could be free from that scourge. So too, I am
suggesting, for terrorism. If enclaves of like-minded and
susceptible people are an indispensable breeding ground for
terrorism, then it is easy to imagine a situation in which
nations, not radically different from the way they are today,
could be mostly free from terrorist threats.
IV. IMPLICATIONS AND LESSONS

What are the lessons for policy and for law? The simplest
and most important is that if a nation aims to prevent terrorist
activities, a good strategy is to prevent the rise of enclaves of
like-minded people. Many of those who become involved in
terrorist activities could end up doing something else with their
lives. Their interest in terrorism comes, in many cases, from an
identifiable set of social mechanisms (generally from particular
associations). If the relevant associations can be disrupted,
terrorism is far less likely to arise.
The second lesson has to do with the idea of "political
correctness." That idea is far more interesting than it seems. It
is true that some groups of left-leaning intellectuals push one
another to extremes, and tow a kind of party line, in part
through a limited argument pool, and in part through
imposing reputational sanctions on those who disagree, or
even ostracizing them. But political correctness is hardly
limited to left-leaning intellectuals. It plays a role in groups of
all kinds. In its most dangerous forms, it is a critical part of
groups that are prone to violence and terrorism, simply
because such groups stifle dissent.
25. See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk
Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683,712 (1999).
26. See Kuran, supra note 3.
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The third lesson has to do with the system of checks and
balances and even constitutional design. Citizens in democratic
nations are hardly immune from the forces discussed here.
Within legislatures, civic organizations, and even courts, group
polarization might well occur. Nor is this necessarily bad. A
movement in a more extreme direction might well be a
movement in a better direction. But serious problems can arise
when extremism is a product of the mechanisms discussed
here, and not of learning through the exchange of diverse
opinions. The institutions of checks and balances can be
understood as a safeguard against group polarization, simply
because those institutions ensure that like-minded people,
operating within a single part of government, will not be able
to move governmental power in their preferred direction.
Consider, for example, the idea of bicameralism and the power
of the president to veto legislation; through these routes, it is
possible to reduce the risk that government policy will be a
product of the forces I have discussed.
The fourth lesson has to do with the treatment of conspiracy,
including but not limited to terrorist conspiracies. Why does
the law punish conspiracy as a separate offense, independent
of the underlying "substantive" crime? It is tempting to think
that this kind of "doubling up" is indefensible, a form of
overkill. But if the act of conspiring leads people moderately
disposed toward criminal behavior to be more than moderately
disposed, precisely because they are conspiring together, it
makes sense, on grounds of deterrence, to impose independent
penalties. Some courts have come close to recognizing this
point.27 The key point is that the act of conspiracy has an
independent effect, that of moving people in more extreme
directions. The point holds for terrorists as well as for everyone
else.
The discussion also offers some lessons about freedom of
association in general, showing some of its many complexities.
Associational freedom is of course an indispensable part of
democracy. No one should deny that point. But when
associational freedom is ensured, group polarization will

27. See Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593-94 (1961) ("Concerted action
decreases the probability that the individuals will depart from their path of
criminality."). I am grateful to Dan Kahan for helpful discussion.
...
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inevitably ensue, as people sort themselves into groups that
seem congenial. From the standpoint of liberty, this is
extremely important. It is also valuable from the standpoint of
democracy, not least because any society's "argument pool"
will be expanded by a wide variety of deliberating groups. If
groups move to extremes, then social fragmentation may be
desirable insofar as it ensures that society as a whole will hear a
wide range of positions and points of view. On the other hand,
freedom of association can increase the risk of social
fragmentation, and social antagonisms, potentially even
violence, can result.
Almost all of the time, the risk is worth tolerating. But when
we are dealing with conspiracies to kill American citizens,
freedom of association is literally dangerous. Hatred itself is
hardly against the law. By itself it is no reason for war. But
when hatred is a product of the social forces outlined here, and
when it makes terrorism possible, there is every reason to
disrupt associations that drive people to violent acts. The line
between associational freedom and conspiracy is not always
crisp and certain. But in the cases I am emphasizing, there is no
real puzzle. When they hate us, it is not a product of
deprivation, individual rage, or religiously grounded
predisposition; it is a result of social forces and, much of the
time, self-conscious conspiracies to fuel hatred. A nation that
seeks to win a war against terrorism must try to disrupt those
conspiracies.

HeinOnline -- 25 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 440 2001-2002

